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Abstract 
    In this paper, the author suggests everal practices and conditions to implement 
corporate code of conduct successfully in order to improve working conditions at overseas 
suppliers' factories. Labor-related issues affect global operation of multinational 
companies. Thus, improving working conditions at overseas suppliers' plants is 
important for international management. Typical way to regulate the labor practices at 
overseas uppliers' factories is to adopt corporate code of conduct. However, merely 
adopting and requiring the factories to comply with the code of conduct is not sufficient. 
Several practices hould be employed along with the code. Specific conditions of plants 
support better implementation of the code of conduct. Based on prior studies and 
multiple cases, this paper presents and discusses those practices and conditions. Several 
limitations of this paper are also discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
    This paper presents some practices and conditions which contribute to improve 
working conditions at overseas suppliers' factories, by facilitating suppliers' factories' 
compliance with the buyer firm's code of conduct. 
    Labor-related issues affect global business ignificantly. In the last few decades, 
multi-national companies (MNCs) transferred their production process, mostly labor-
intensive one, to low-waged developing countries (Frenkel and Kim, 2004). MNCs seek 
to maintain profitability by reducing labor-cost, taking advantage of the low wage there. 
As more and more companies outsourced their production to overseas suppliers; or 
purchased assemblies, raw materials, or products from worldwide suppliers, working 
conditions at the suppliers' factories in developing counties have been deteriorated (Yu, 
2009). Then, in the middle of 1990s, anti-sweatshop campaign occurred against branded 
companies, especially in garment (Emmelhainz & Adams, 1999) and footwear (Yu, 2009) 
industries. A number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), mass media, 
consumer groups, and student groups criticized brand-named MNCs for poor working 
conditions at their supplies' factories in developing countries (Emmelhainz & Adams, 
1999; Pun, 2005; Yu, 2008; 2009). The main concern was in "low wages, forced 
overtime and long working hours, hazardous and unhealthy working conditions, child 
labor, sexual harassment, and intimidation and repression of (independent) labor unions" 
(Yu, 2009, p.234). 
    Labor-related issues till remain unresolved and affect international operation of 
companies. For example, inthe end of May 2010, ten young factory workers committed 
suicide at a Chinese plant of Foxconn Technology, a Chinese subsidiary of Taiwanese 
contract electronics manufacturer; Hon Hai Precision Industry, produces for many
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famous global brands such as Apple, Dell, Hewlett-Packard, and Sony. The media 
reported the cause for the event might be poor working conditions uch as low wage for 
the workers and excessive overtime. Tire company finally decided to raise wages for its 
factory workers by 20% (Barboza, 2010; Hille & Kwong, 2010; Tsai, 2010). Japanese 
leading automakers, too, suffered workers' trikes over and over again in China from the 
end of May to the end of June 2010. Requiring raising wage level, workers at auto parts 
plants for Honda Motor and Toyota Motor broke strikes. Assembly plants of both 
manufacturers in China were forced to close during the strikes because supply from the 
suppliers' plants topped.' In this way, labor-related issues have significant influence on 
companies' global operation. 
1.2 Significance and purpose of this paper 
    Most U.S. and European MNCs responded to the anti-sweatshop campaign by 
adopting corporate codes of conduct (Frenkel & Kim, 2004; Mamic, 2005; Pun, 2005; 
Yu, 2008; 2009). Corporate code of conduct is a set of guidelines and rules with which 
suppliers must comply. As discussed later, code of conduct is beneficial to regulate and 
improve working conditions at suppliers' factories, though it has some disadvantages. 
However, few Japanese companies have adopted codes of conduct (e.g., Kolk, van Tulder, 
& Welters, 1999). 
    Thus, purpose of this paper is to provide some guidelines for Japanese companies to
implement codes of conduct successfully to improve working conditions at their overseas 
suppliers' factories. Some practices and conditions to ensure code compliance by 
suppliers' factories are drawn upon from findings from existing cases of leading MNCs 
including Japanese companies. 
1.3 Definition of main actors 
    Buyer or buying company (firm) refers to a company which outsources its 
production to developing countries, or a firm which purchases parts, raw materials, or
products from its contracting suppliers' factories, It is also mentioned as MNC or global
' Honda Motor shut down its plants in China after workers at its three suppliers' plants 
(namely Honda Auto Parts Manufacturing, Yutaka Giken, and NHK Spring) went on 
strike (BusinerrWeek, 2010, May 28; Young & Kim, 2010; Kim, 2010). Toyota Motor 
suspended production at its assembly plants in China because ofworkers' trike at Toyota 
Gosei's (Shirouzu, 2010) and Denso's (Schepp, 2010) plant. 
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 firm (company). Suppliers' factories (plants) are commissioned bythe buyer to produce 
 products, parts, or raw materials for the buying company, while owned and operated by 
 supplier company. 
 1.4 Structure of this paper 
     The next section starts with development and definition of corporate codes of 
 conduct. Then, several practices to support code of conduct and to ensure code 
compliance by the suppliers' factories are presented and discussed. Then specific 
conditions which assist better implementation f code of conduct are suggested. Those 
factors are drawn up from findings from prior studies and existing cases. Finally, some 
limitations of this paper are discussed. 
2. Code of conduct 
2.1 Definition and development 
    As discussed in the previous ection, many multinational firms, especially in 
garment and footwear industry, adopted corporate codes of conduct, responding to the 
anti-sweatshop campaign against violation of workers' rights at suppliers' factories in 
developing countires. Corporate code of conduct refers to "a document stating anumber 
of social and environmental standards and principles that a firm's uppliers are expected to
fulfill" (Andersen & Skjoett-Larsen, 2009, p.78). As noted in this definition, code of 
conduct addresses issues related to social as well as environmental responsibility. Labor-
related standards include prohibitions on child labor and forced labor, freedom of 
association, occupational health and safety (Mamic, 2005; Pun, 2005; Yu, 2008), no 
discrimination in employment, right to collective bargaining (Pun, 2005; Yu, 2008), 
wage, working hours (Mamic, 2005; Yu, 2008), etc. 
    Labor-related codes of conduct are adopted mainly in labor-intensive industries 
(Frenkel & Kim, 2004; Yu, 2008), especially in clothing, footwear, toy (Egels-Zanden, 
2007; Yu, 2008), textile, food and beverage (Yu, 2008) industries. At the national level, 
U.S. and Canadian firms are the most likely to adopt labor-related codes of conduct, 
followed by Spanish and Australian companies (Egels-Zanden, 2007). 
    As the number of codes of conduct adopted by MNCs increased, the more studies 
conducted on how to implement the code of conduct and on the content of the existing 
companies' codes of conduct.
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2.2 Advantages and disadvantages of code of conduct 
     Code of conduct has some advantages to regulate suppliers' labor practices. For 
example, corporate codes of conduct are "the most visible element in the approach of 
large multinational companies" (Andersen & Skjoett-Larsen, 2009, p.77). And Ciliberti, 
de Groot, de Haan, and Pontrandolfo (2009) argue that code of conduct is useful 
compared to contracts and trust because contracts cannot regulate unforeseen 
circumstances, while trust takes time to become a level to govern supply chains. 
Furthermore, the buyer firm can modify labor elations procedures tosuit its own needs; 
and the firm can receive l gitimacy on its products (Frenkel & Scott, 2002). 
    However, code of conduct is also revealed to have some disadvantages. If a buyer 
firm adopts code of conduct o supplier's factory, the plant manager focuses on how to 
comply with it. The buyer company conducts monitoring to assess whether their 
business partner comply with the provision of the code. Several articles report hat 
managements of upplier factories deceive monitoring organization (e.g., Egels-Zanden, 
2007; Jiang, 2009; Pun, 2005; Yu, 2008). In order to receive favorable valuation, 
factory managers forge record for under-aged workers, working hours, or wages (Pun, 
2005), or conceal ctual amount of output (Yu, 2008), or instruct heir workers to reply 
desired answer to the monitors' questions (Egels-Zanden, 2007; Pun, 2005). 
    Other disadvantages of codes of conduct are that the code can regulate only the 
first-tier suppliers; and codes exclude important issues for factory workers (Frenkel & 
Scott, 2002). 
    As the argument on its benefit of adopting code of conduct is inconsistent, i  may 
be concluded that merely introducing the code is not sufficient; however, some 
supporting factors arc necessary to ensure that suppliers' factories comply with the code 
and to improve working conditions at factories' workplace. 
2.3 Present situation of Japanese companies 
    Despite code of conduct has many advantages, few Japanese firms have adopted 
codes of conduct (e.g., Kolk, et al., 1999). In addition, Japanese companies "have limited 
knowledge over issues of human rights" (p.143), according to interviews with CSR 
managers of 15 leading Japanese firms (Fukukawa & Teramoro, 2009). Although a large 
number of Japanese companies tablish CSR policy including workers' human rights or 
labor standards (Welford, 2005), it may be concluded that Japanese firms may not 
undertake initiatives in practice toward labor-related issues at overseas suppliers' factories 
(although they established policies). Thus, providing advice on how to implement code 
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of conduct for Japanese firms is useful.
3. Factors to facilitate and ensure code compliance 
    In this section, I propose some practices or conditions to facilitate and to ensure 
compliance with MNCs' codes of conduct by the suppliers' factories. Discussion is based 
on review on existing cases of leading companies from prior empirical literatures (most of 
them are exploratory study) and from some online documents. 
    Numerous studies were conducted on implementing codes of conduct to their 
suppliers' factories. Drawn from those literatures, ome factors were found to contribute 
to or to support code compliance by the suppliers' factories. Those factors are broadly 
classified into practices both for the buyer companies themselves and for the factories, 
characteristics of suppliers' factories, and social context (Table 1).
    In order to ensure compliance with the buyer's code of conduct by suppliers' 
factories, merely adopting and requiring the factories tocomply with the code of conduct 
is not sufficient. Some initiatives or practices should be introduced and undertaken. 
Those actions are presented and discussed, based on prior studies and relevant cases of 
major companies including Japanese firms.
3.1 Practices to complement code of conduct 
3.1.1 Training and education 
    One of the practices which are necessary to ensure code compliance by suppliers' 
factories is training. Training and education needs to be provided for multiple layers of 
employees both at buyer firms and at supplier's factories. At the MNC level, training 
session should be designed and provided for managers, members who are directly 
involved in code implementation, monitors, and other employees. The training for 
buyer's personnel is provided to shape common understanding about CSR and socially 
responsible management of supply chain, relevant skill and knowledge of management 
and monitoring (Oishi & Terada, 2006).
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        Table 1 
Broad classification
Practices within buyer I Education nd training for its
firm 
Buyer's practices 
suppliers' factories
Factors to facilitate code compliance by suppliers' factories 
    Detailed classification Existing studies
own employees
Andersen & Skjoett-Larsen (2009); Frenkel & 
Scott (2002); Mamic (2005); Oishi & TeradaI
(2006)
ticc
ics
to Buyer's managers visit
suppliers' factories frequently
and assist for code compliance
and improvement
Andersen &
Zanden (200
Mm (2004);
Kochan, Ro
& Brause (2007)
Skjoett-Larsen (2009); Egcls-
7); Frenkel (2001); Brenkel &
&enkel & Scott (2002); L.&,,
mis, & Qin (2007); Locke, Qin,
; Locke & Romis (2007)
! Communicate vision of code
f of conduct
Andersen &
(2005)
Skjoett-Larsen (2009); Mamic
Sharc costs arise from
implementing code of
Jiang (2009);Mamic (2005); Yu (2008)
conduct
factories
Social context
Education and training for 
managers and employees
Andersen & Skjoett-Larsen (2009); 
(2001); Frenkel & Kim (2004);
Frenkel 
Mamic
(2005); Oishi & Terada (2006); von Weltzien
Hoivik & Mele (2007)
ions at suppliers' Small (numbers of employees)Frenkel (2001); Frenkel & Kim (2004);
Locke, Kochan, Romis, & Qin (2007); Locke,
Qin, & Brause (2007)
Located near buyer's local
office
Frenkel & Km (2004)
Owned by foreign supplier
firm
Locke, Qin, & Bourse (2007)
Existence of independent
trade union representing
workers
Frenkel (2001); Frenkel & Kim (2001); Pun
(2005); Yu (2008)
ntext Stringent enforcement of
labor-related legislation and
Frenkel & Kim (2004); Locke, Koehan,
Romis, & Qin (2007); Locke, Qin, & Brause
regulation by host-country's 
government
(2007)
MNCslevel 
    In NEC, training is conducted for those directly involved in code implementation 
and general employees. This leading Japanese multinational company in IT industry 
carries out training program for the group companies around the world. For all 
employees, NEC has been communicating its vision and activities in CSR via the Internet 
and the Intranet since October 2003. The corporation has also been holding workshops 
for CSR Promoters, who are responsible for activities at each group companies, in Asia,
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China, Europe, and North America since the late 2004 (The Japan Institute for Labour 
Policy and Training, 2005). 
    Several expertise are required for monitoring staffs in the field of employment, 
human rights, occupational safety and health, environment, product safety and quality, 
etc (Oishi & Terada, 2006). Mizuno, Japanese l ading manufacturer of sports equipment 
and sportswear, entrusts Chinese NGO with developing its auditors to monitor suppliers 
in China. Four junior Chinese employees, who have expertise in ISO14001, 
environment, or law and are good at Japanese or English, are trained as monitors (Adachi, 
2006).
Suppliers' factories level 
    At the suppliers' factories level, the workers are the most important arget of 
training program. However, limited numbers of companies provide such training for the 
factory workers (Mamic, 2005). The aim of the training for factory workers is to inform 
them of rights which they are granted and guaranteed, and relevant international treaty 
and local legislation (Oishi & Terada, 2006). If the workers acquire some knowledge 
about he buyer's code, even if the knowledge is vague, ithas a significant influence on the 
factory management. The managers become careful about the working conditions 
because the workers will complain to the labor practices using the code, claiming their 
rights (Frenkel, 2001). In reality, however, some workers are not informed that they hold 
rights, especially for overtime working hours and freedom of association (Unno, 2006). 
    Education for factory workers is provided through exhibiting the code (translated 
into the local language) atthe workplace for easy reference (Frenkel, 2001; Frenkel & 
Kim, 2004; von Weltzien Hoivik & Mele, 2009). For example, Stormberg, a Norwegian 
small clothing company, translates its code of conduct into Chinese and displays it in 
public areas throughout suppliers' factories in China, which produces textiles for the 
company (von Weltzien Hoivik & Mele, 2009). In two cases of U.S. athletic footwear 
companies, employees have to pass an examination questioning the code of conduct 
(Frenkel, 2001; Frenkel & Kim, 2004). 
    Training for managers atsuppliers' factories i  also an important issue, Factory 
managers in developing countries usually possess limited knowledge r garding CSR and 
are confused where and how to make required improvements Qiang, 2009). 
    The purpose of training for the factory managers is to develop understanding and 
awareness about code of conduct. Outline, significance, objectives, and expected 
outcomes of the initiatives and challenges in management should be provided through
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the education program (Oishi & Terada, 2006). 
    Education to facilitate understanding and awareness among the suppliers' factories 
managers i offered by many MNCs including Japanese firms. In 2006 TOTO, the 
world's largest oilet manufacturer based in Japan, explained its CSR initiatives to top 
managements of approximately 170 suppliers in China (Ikuta, 2008). Another case is 
Shiseido, one of the Japanese major hair care and cosmetics producers. Since 2006 
Shiseido's procurement department has held annual briefing sessions ofpurchasing policy 
and section meetings of activity policy sessions in order to communicate he company's 
idea and principles of CSR activities to providers of raw materials and business partners 
(Kuwayama, 2006; Shiseido, n.d.). Similar practice is also observed in retailers' activity. 
AEON, the Japan-based largest retailer in Asia, hosts "AEON Supplier Code of Conduct 
Individual Support Sessions" to its suppliers and held the sessions twelve times from 
March 2009 to February 2010 (AEON, n.d.).
3.1.2 Assistance for improvements 
Collaboration with the suppliers' factories 
    As previously mentioned, managers of suppliers' factories own limited knowledge 
where and how to accomplish code requirements and make necessary change (Jiang, 
2009). Thus, buying companies should provide some assistance for the factories. 
    Advanced approach to provide assistance is collaborative (Matnic, 2005). Therefore, 
collaborative r lationship between managers of the buyer firm and its suppliers' factories 
is essential nd the close tie is constructed through frequent visits by the MNC's manager 
and staff at the local office to the factories. Then, jointly with the factory managers, the 
expatriate personnel attempts o solve problems and to make necessary change of various 
systems and practices. 
    This is evidenced by case studies on several large MNCs such as Nike (Locke, 
Kochan, Romis, & Qin, 2007; Locke, Qin, & Brause, 2007; Locke & Romis, 2007), 
adidas (Frenkel & Scott, 2002), and anonymous U.S. large athletic footwear company in 
southern China (Frenkel, 2001) and Korea (Frenkel & Kim, 2004). If the buyer's taff 
visits the suppliers' factories frequently, the ideology, or vision, of the code of conduct will 
more likely to be transferred to the factories' managers and employees (Frenkel, 2001; 
Frenkel & Kim, 2004). Communicating the vision will facilitate commitment by the 
factories to comply with the code of conduct. In addition, frequent visits by the buyer's 
personnel build trust between the buyer's taff and its suppliers' factories' managers 
(Locke, Kochan, Romis, & Qin, 2007; Locke & Romis, 2007).
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    After the collaborative r lationship was built, the buyer's taff and the factory 
managers can work together to solve labor-related problems (Frenkel, 2001; Frenkel & 
Kim, 2004; Frenkel & Scott, 2002). In addition, they can also work together to 
introduce more efficient manufacturing system (i.e., lean-production system), along with 
several HR practices such as necessary training for workers (Locke, Kochan, Romis, & 
Qin, 2007; Locke & Romis, 2007), empowerment, involving workers into decision 
making, or providing workers with great autonomy (Frenkel & Scott, 2002; Locke, 
Kochan, Romis, & Qin, 2007; Locke & Romis, 2007). Introducing lean production line 
contributed to more efficient production, resulted in cost savings and enhanced 
productivity. As a result, the factories could raise wage level and reduce overtime work 
(Frenkel & Scott, 2002; Locke, Kochan, Romis, & Qin, 2007; Locke & Romis, 2007). 
    Japanese companies also provide the collaborative assistance for their suppliers' 
factories. There exist several cases among Japanese companies. The author distributed 
questionnaire to 409 Japanese companies in Taiwan in various industries. The author 
found that some companies provide some education or instruction to their suppliers. For 
example, TI Petrochemicals,  eller of resin, offers technical education and some training 
for its suppliers. Another case is K Motors. The automobile manufacture gives individual 
instruction especially about safety by its specialized department. 
    Education and training delivered by expatriate personnel is a characteristic strategy 
of Japanese firms' quality control in East Asia (Ito, 2002). Thus, it is evident hat 
Japanese companies own advantage in this action.
3.1.3 Sharing costs arise from code implementation 
    As well as provide ducation, the buyer company should share costs arise from code 
implementation, in order to facilitate code compliance by the suppliers' factories, When 
implement the global firm's code of conduct, the suppliers' factories have to bear on some 
cost, such as raising wage, introducing new equipment, or providing education for 
workers. The buying company should share those expenses tomaintain profitability of 
the suppliers' factories. If the factory cannot sustain its competitiveness, the factory 
refuses to commit o comply with the code of conduct Qiang, 2009). This is proved by 
the study on Reebok's supplier's factory in China (Yu, 2008). When Reebok adopted its 
code of conduct to the contractor's factory, the footwear company did not share any costs. 
The factory had to improve its working conditions, for example, raising wage level. At 
the same time, the plant was also required to meet he demands for producing with lower 
price, higher quality and timely delivery. As a result, in order to maintain its bottom line,
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the factory managers kept its actual payment to the workers below the level where the 
plant could sustain its profitability. It was achieved by concealing actual output or 
correcting working hours from the workers, while reporting the desired performance to
the monitors from Reebok (Yu, 2008). 
    'Ihe Reebok's case suggests hat the global company should share costs arise from 
upholding wage level or introducing lean manufacturing system. 
    Other examples of assistance include: development of corrective action plans, 
guidelines and training materials; conducting joint audits; providing explanations of the 
local law and having the MNC review the operations of the suppliers' factories to 
understand the impact of the demand by the code of conduct (Mamic, 2005). 
3.2 Necessary conditions for better code compliance 
    Along with those supporting actions discussed above, specific conditions help 
ensure that suppliers' factories comply with the buyer's code of conduct. Some 
characteristics of suppliers' factories and existence of independent trade union are 
discussed below. 
3.2.1 Characteristics of suppliers' factories 
Size 
    One of the important factory's characteristics is its size (i.e., the number of 
employees). The fewer the number of workers i , the mote the factory is likely to comply 
with the provisions of the code. This is argued by a number of scholars (e.g., Frenkel, 
2001; Frenkel & Kim, 2004; Locke, Kochan, Romis, & Qin, 2007; Locke, Qin, & 
Brause, 2007). For example, Locke and his colleagues (Locke, Kochan, Romis, & Qin, 
2007; Locke, Qin, & Brause, 2007) analyze the score of M-Audit, which is Nike's in-
house monitoring scheme targeting its all suppliers' factories around the world. The data 
was derived from over 800 factories across 51 countries. Conducting regression a alysis 
of some variables and M-Audit score, they found statistically significant negative 
relationship between factory size and the audit score, suggesting that "working conditions 
in smaller factories are better than in larger factories" (Locke, Qin, & Brause, 2007, 
p.16). They surmised its reason as "smaller factories ... are easier to control and monitor 
than larger facilities" (Locke, Qin, & Brause, 2007, p.16). 
    In contrast to the fact that the smaller factories are more suitable for code 
compliance than the larger plants, supplier firm should be large (i.e., employing a lot of 
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workers). This is suggested by a comparative study conducted on a U.S. large athletic 
footwear company and its four contract plants located in Korea (Frenkel & Kim, 2004).
Ownership 
   The case study on Nike (Locke, Qin, & Brause, 2007) also found that factories 
owned by foreign supplier firms receive better treatment than factories owned by 
compatriot supplier companies.
Location 
    Location, or proximity, of suppliers' factories to the buyer company's local office is 
another element of the characteristics. The closer the suppliers' factories are located to the 
buyer's local subsidiary, the mote the factories are likely to comply with the code of 
conduct. Frenkel and Kim (2004) suggested this trend based on their finding from 
comparison of contractor's factories in Korea to the plants in China. The buyer 
company's local office, which is a large U.S. athletic shoemaker, is located in Korea. And 
compliance with the buyer's code is more likely to be achieved atKorean workplaces than 
at Chinese factories, The reason behind this phenomenon is explained as the buyer firm's 
expatriate manager visited Korean workplace more frequently than Chinese workplaces, 
and it contributed to face-to-face ontact between the shoemaker's manager and the 
Korean plants' manager. This assists the ideology of the company's code in being 
transferred to the factories (Frenkel & Kim, 2004). In this way, the proximity of the 
factory is related to frequent visits to the factory by the buyer firm's taff. This leads to 
better communication f vision of the code of conduct, and help implementation f the 
code. 
    Proximity of suppliers' factories to the buyer's office is also important for delivering 
education for the factories managers. If the suppliers' plants are close to the MNC's site, 
it makes it easier for the buyer's manager frequently visits the factories. Then, the 
expatriate manager can visit the factories on a regular basis and provide assistance or
education for the suppliers' factories, as discussed inthe previous section.
3.2.2 Independent trade union 
    Independent trade union should exist at the suppliers' factories. Through 
independent trade union, the factory workers can claime their rights and negotiate for 
better working conditions with the management. Several studies show the presence of 
independent rade union representing workers' rights supports uppliers' factories comply
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with the buyer's code of conduct (e.g., Frenkel, 2001; Frenkel & Kim, 2004; pun, 2005; 
Yu, 2009). 
    And through independent trade union, workers can participate informulating code 
of conduct and reflect heir opinion in the code. A case study on Reebok (Yu, 2009) 
shows that factory worker had an influence on developing code of conduct collectively (as 
a trade union), especially regarding issues of working conditions. And when workers took 
part in the code development process, the working conditions for the workers improved. 
Thus, the existence of independent trade union is crucial for better compliance with the 
code of conduct. 
    However, there are some difficulties. Even if trade union exists, everal factors limit 
its effectiveness. For example, selection of representatives is not open; unions are co-
opted by management or managers are members ofunions (Roberts, 2002). 
    And in some developing countries, establishment of independent trade union is 
regulated by the local aw. In China, trade union is allowed to establish only under a 
system of government-sponsored t a e unions, namely All-China Federation of Trade 
Unions (Fujii, 2006). 
4. Conclusions 
    This paper attempts to reveal factors which contribute to and facilitate compliance 
by suppliers' factories with the buyer's code of conduct. Based on prior studies and cases 
of leading companies including Japanese firms, the author proposed some best practices 
to support code implementation a d to ensure code compliance by suppliers' factories. 
In addition, several conditions which help better implementation of code of conduct were 
suggested. 
    The body of discussion issummarized asfollows. In the beginning, two practices 
were presented as a supporting factor for smoother implementation of the code of 
conduct. The first one is training and education. Training should be delivered both at 
buyer company and suppliers' factories. At the buyer level, employees those who are 
directly involved in implementing code of conduct must acquire relevant knowledge and 
skill. At the suppliers' factory level, the workers hould be informed of rights they are 
granted. The managers of the factory should have great awareness and deep 
understanding of the code of conduct. 
    The second practice is to provide assistance. One of the assistances is to offer 
instruction by the buyer's expatriate personnel regarding change of organization, 
production system, HR practices; ortechnical issues, Collaborative r lationship between 
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the buyer's expatriate staff and the factory managers is a key. The buyer's personnel 
should visit the plants frequently in order to build such relationship. Another assistance 
is to share costs arise from code implementation. 
    Along with those practices, several conditions which facilitate code implementation 
were discussed. Some of the characteristics of suppliers' factories are important. The 
suppliers' factories should possess small number of workers, be owned by foreign supplier 
firm, and be located near the local office of the buying company. 
    Another aspect of suppliers' factories is existence of independent rade union. "Ihe 
factory workers could not claim their rights and negotiate for better working conditions 
unless the independent rade union was organized at the workplace.
Limitations 
    Several limitation of this paper should be noted. First, this study focuses mainly on 
large MNCs. Therefore, some of the findings may not be applicable to small- and 
medium-sized nterprises (SMEs) due to their limited resources. For example, SMEs may 
not afford to share costs arise from implementing the code of conduct. 
    The reason for focusing on large MNCs is that the existing studies addressed 
implementation f code of conduct is limited to those on large MNCs. Only two articles 
studied SMEs implementing code of conduct. The one examined four SMEs in Italy and 
Netherlands (Ciliberti, et al., 2009). These firms are either in garment, consumer 
products, or construction i dustry. This article, however, does not address the case of 
implementing companies own codes of conduct, but studies the case of implementing 
SA8000, an international standard inwhich multiple organizations participate 2 
    The other study addressed SMEs implementing code of conduct is by van Weltzien 
Hoivik and Mele (2009) which addresses a Norwegian small clothing company called
E SA8000 was established in 1997 by an U.S. NGO, and now administrated byan NGO 
called Social Accountability International (SAI). SA8000 is a voluntary initiative, and 
multiple stakeholders such as MNCs, international unions, and NGOs participate in it 
(O'Rourke, 2006). SA8000 sets nine principles: child labor; forced labor; health and 
safety; freedom of association and right to collective bargaining; discrimination; 
discipline; working hours; compensation; a d management system (SAI, n.d.). A third-
party auditor, representing SAI, conducts monitoring facilities (Ciliberti et al., 2009). As 
of June 30, 2010, over 2,200 facilities are certified of SA8000 (Social Accountability 
Accreditation Services, 2010).
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Stormberg. Stormberg designs andd sells outdoor and sports clothing, and commissions 
14 factories in China to produce textiles. Although the study reveals that the small 
enterprise can achieve financial success with the socially responsible b havior at the same 
time, it does not prove that its initiative led to improve working conditions at the 
suppliers' factories. Future study is needed targeting code implementation by SMEs. 
    However, SMEs have some advantages a  well. They may not conduct monitoring 
by in-house auditors because they may not afford to own sufficient employees for the job. 
Inevitably, they have to depend on independent auditors. Independent monitoring 
provides transparency and credibility for the monitoring process. Moreover, SMEs have 
an advantage over constructing collaborative r lationships with their suppliers' factories. 
SMEs are small customer for the suppliers' factories compared to large MNCs in terms of 
the amount of order. The factories prefer to contract large customers, eeking for higher 
revenue. Thus, SMEs possess little power and control over their suppliers' factories. 
-Therefore, SMEs cannot simply adopt code of conduct o suppliers' factories and force 
the factories tocomply with the standards. They have to build collaborative relationship 
with the factories and require them to comply with the provisions. 
    Another limitation of this paper is that it does not explore the optimum content of 
code of conduct. Although a number of researchers conducted content analysis of codes 
of conduct (see Table 2 for examples), those studies merely describe the content of 
existing companies' codes of conduct, and do not investigate and identify what kind of 
content is the best o improve working conditions at suppliers' factories. 
    The third limitation is related to monitoring. This paper does not address 
monitoring system. That is because no consistent conclusion exists on which type of 
monitoring is the best to regulate suppliers' labor practices. Debate on monitoring is 
limited about its transparency and credibility (e.g., Frenkel & Kim, 2004; Mamic, 2005). 
Internal monitoring is conducted by buyer's in-house auditing staff, while external 
monitoring is performed by accounting or consulting firm hired by the buying company, 
or by other for-profit organizations (Yu, 2009). Both of these monitoring processes are 
criticized for their transparency and credibility. Accordingly, U.S. and European leading 
apparel companies are becoming to use independent monitoring conducted by 
organizations which have no relationship with the buying firms, such as NGO 
(International Labour Organization, 2000; Kolk & van Tulder, 2002b; Yu, 2009). 
However, the perspective of this discussion is on the validity and social egitimacy of 
monitoring. Previous tudies lack on which type of monitoring system is the best o
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improve working conditions at suppliers' factories.' It may well be that lack of data 
makes it impossible to analyze the performance of independent monitoring system 
(O'Rourke, 2003). That may because there is no data available to analyze the 
performance of independent monitoring system (O'Rourke, 2003).
Table 2: Existing studies on the content of codes of conduct
I Articles 
Emmelhainz & Adams (1999) 
Kolk & van Tulder (2002a)
Kolk & van Tulder (2002b) 
Kook, van Tuldett & Welters (1999)
                   Samples 
Apparel companies on the U.S. Department 
Trendsetters List'.
or Labor's
n=27
Companies (n= 40 [U.S. and European MNCs, and
CSRJ)
International organizations (n=4)
Non-governmental organizations (n = 5)
Business upport groups (n = 6)
Total n =55
C&A, Gap, Hennes & Mauritz (H&M), Levi Srra",
n=6
lt r  ( ) Companies (n = 84 [U.S. firms it, 1997 global f
d pioneers in
• Co panies (n = 84 (U S Fir s Fortune 500 
 ranking, European firms, and pioneers in CSR]) 
• Social interest groups (n = 13) 
• Business upport groups (n = 24) 
• International organizations (n= 11) 
Total n= 132
van Tinder & Kolk (2001) 
I
• Companies (n = 88 [Nike, Reebok, Puma, Mizuno; and others 
 from 1997 global Fortune 500 ranking, European firms, and 
 pioneers in CSR]) 
• Business upport groups (n= 27) 
• Social interest groups (n = 16) 
• International organizations (n - 14) 
Total n= 145
' Trendsetter is a group of U.S. major etailers and manufactures. It was founded, In December 1995, to work 
together to eradicate sweatshops. As of March 1997, 34 companies are listed (Emmelhainz & Adams, 1999).
' O'Rourke (2002) is the only study which examines and reveals limitations of external 
monitoring system, based on a case study on PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC)'s 
monitoring process at garment factories in Shanghai, China and Seoul, Korea. PwC is 
the world's largest private monitor of labor and environmental practices. 
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